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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

ANDREW WEISBERG,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20001056-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction for stalking, a second degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-2(2)(e)
(1999 & Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Is the evidence sufficient to establish that defendant used a dangerous weapon,
where he moved a shot gunfromthe passenger compartment of his car to the trunk, in
full view of anyone watching from inside the victim's business?
To prevail on a sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict, "'the one challenging the
verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v.
1

Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 1j 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). This Court will not overturn a jury verdict unless the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, is "so insufficient that
reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.'" State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, %
42,994P.2dl77.
2. Was the jury correctly instructed that "exhibiting" a dangerous weapon "in
such a manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person " constitutes use of a
dangerous weapon?
"The propriety of the instructions given to the jury is a question of law [this
Court] therefore review[s] the trial court's instructions for correctness." Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
3. Is the stalking statute constitutionally overbroad and vague as applied to
defendant who repeatedly appeared in the parking lot outside the victim's business for
no apparently legitimate purpose and threatened her physical safety, including
exhibiting a shot gun?
"When reviewing statutes for constitutionality, a statute is presumed
constitutional, and '[the reviewing court] resolve[s] any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality/" Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Utah App. 1997)
(quoting Society ofSeparationistst Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993)).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Copies of pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes ami IIIJRN .tit" contained in
addendum D, inJnJiiu: ih<: lolloping:
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-106.5 (1999 & Supp. 2001);
§ 76-1-601(5) (1999 & Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant w as charged. a ith stalking, a second degree felon} (R 1) Follow ing a
two-dav |ur\ in.il hrlii mi 25-26 October 2000, he was convicted as charged (R262:318).
The trial court imposed the statutory term of one-to-fifteen years with credit for time
served (R263:30). Defendant timely appealed (R253-54).
S I ATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Defendant blamed victim Robin Archibald for an alleged investment loss of
approximately $115,000. He retaliated by stalking Robin at her place of business and
threatening that, among other things, he'd "like to hire some black men
her"(Sui

" jially rape

I.

Robin first became acquainted with defendant in April 1997 when he and another
man conducted a real estate transaction with her company, Avis and Archibald
Company (AATC) (R2'> I J'i1 "M" •' •

i ^

* U" fimill' , bJn i l e i r n d u n i -.iiftr ••

loss an< i • si led \ i\ F'C, claiming that his loss was the result of Robin and AATC breaching

^he facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92.
3

their duty to him (id.). Robin and AATC denied any responsibility for defendant's
financial loss (id.). The parties eventually reached a settlement (id.).
"Robin, you better back off or
you will find your cold, dead body in afield somewhere "
On 11 August 1997, Robin received a fax from C&A Properties, a limited liability
company of which defendant was the principal—the fax stated, "Liar, liar, pants on fire"
(R261:36-37). Around this same time, Robin began to notice that defendant would pull
into AATC's parking lot in his "big red" Dodge sport truck and slow down or stop, in
order to stare into the glass-fronted office: "... I would just see him pull in, slow down,
kind of staring into [AATC] and then go down and turn around and come back and stare
in . . . he would be just looking and just very slow, slower even than normal traffic"
(R261:26, 39). During this same period, Robin also received countless hang-up calls and
one call from raspy-voiced person who threatened Robin that she'd "better back off or
[she would] find [her] cold, dead body in a field somewhere" (R261:38).
"It's like a horror film stare"
On 14 October 1997, Robin was working alone and late at AATC when she heard
"a banging . . . like a boom box or radio" coming from the parking lot (R261:40,44).
Robin looked out the window into the darkened night and saw defendant sitting in his
truck staring back at her (R261:43). None of the near-by businesses were open (id.).
Robin called 911 and reported defendant's license plate number (id.). Defendant

4

remained in the parking lot staring at Robin with what she described as a "horror film
stare" for approximately five-minutes before cli i v nig aw ay (R 261:43)
A

\ \ n parking lot "at least once a

week, sometimes twice, sometimes every day, sometimes two or three times a day"
(R261:48). On some of these occasions, defendant was patronizing near-by businesses
(id.). On numerous other occasions,

, :< •

it

would pull in and just sit in his car. Sometimes he would get out of his car
and walk down the sidewalk and stare at me, walk back up the sidewalk
and get in his car and leave. Sometimes he would go into the cleaners and
leave the cleaners, nothing in his hands. Didn't take anything in and didn't
take anything out. Sometimes he'd just drive through.
(R261:49).
"Bring it on detective, bring it on "
On 30 March 1998, Officer Nelson of the South Ogden Police Department
followed up on Robin's complaints about defendant's behavior: "[Robin] had indicated
or reported • • defendant] was pinking in Iront ol Itn business MU\ w.ilfhirty liei .iml
her employees . . . She also indicated that [defendant], she had observed [defendant]
following her in her vehicle and she suspected [defendant] of sending a curious fax to
her business" (R262:189-1W>, Officer Nelson spoke w till tlaaiciaiii over ilir lolephoiu'
(R262:1 •-*

^fondant claimed that he was in the AATC parking lot conducting

business and he also denied sending the fax (R262:191). Officer Nelson informed
defendant that the police department "would continue monitoring his situation and [] put

5

[defendant] on notice that if [he] continued his pursuit of [Robin], that [the police] would
pursue stalking charges" (R262:192). Defendant replied, "Bring it on detective, bring it
on" (id.).
"What in the hell did you do to make [defendant] so mad? "
Approximately one week later, Robin encountered defendant at a local restaurant.
On 6 April 1998, Robin and Casey, an AATC employee, went to lunch at Winger's
restaurant in Ogden, Utah (R261:49-50, 105). Driving into the Winger's parking lot,
Robin and Casey saw defendant sitting in his car in the southwest parking area
(R261:52). Robin and Casey assumed that defendant was not planning to enter Winger's
and parked in the northwest parking area and walked toward the entrance (id.). When
Robin and Casey were "fifteen feet before the door, [defendant] rounded the south corner
of Winger's" (R261:53). While looking at Robin, defendant "reached into his coat really
slowly and acted as if he was going to pull something out" (R261:107). Thinking that
defendant had a gun, Robin became extremely nervous (R261:53). Ultimately, defendant
pulled a cell phone from his pocket (R261:53, 107). Seeking to avoid further contact
with defendant, Robin immediately entered the restaurant (R261:54). Casey followed
behind Robin and when she opened the restaurant door, defendant approached and
"slammed the inside of the door with his hand . . . [causing] a loud bang" (R261:54,
108). The waitress immediately seated Robin and Casey after noticing that both of them
were visibly shaken (R261:54). Defendant walked past Robin and Casey and "mumbled
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something about black" (R261:55). Defendant then abruptly sat down at a booth with
Dennis Porter, a business acquaintance to both defendant and Robin (R261:55, 110). A
few minutes later, defendant got up from the booth, walked by Robin and Casey, flipped
them off, and walked out the door (R261:56, 110). After defendant left the restaurant,
Porter approached Robin and asked, "what in the hell did you do to make [defendant] so
mad?" (R261:57). Porter then related to Robin what defendant said (Supp. Record).
Specifically, Porter reported that defendant had told the three men seated at
Porter's table that he (defendant) recognized Robin's car and that "he believed he had
bought it" (id.). Defendant also made several statements about what he would like to
see happen to Robin, including:
•"I'd like to hire some black men to brutally rape her... No, she fdprobably
enjoy it"[;]
• "If she were alone, Fd run over her with my truck and then I would back over
her to make sure the job was done"[\] and
• "[I] would like her severed head on a fucking platter"
(id.). Upon hearing of defendant's threats, Robin "started bawling" (R261:111).
"[Why do you] workf]for a bunch of liars and thieves? "
Following the incident at the Winger's restaurant, defendant was in the AATC
parking lot approximately twice a week (R261:113). On one of these occasions,
defendant approached Casey in the parking lot and asked her why "she worked for a
bunch of liars and thieves" (R261:58, 114-115). Because of defendant's actions, Robin
7

began keeping AATC's front door locked at all times and, at night, parked her car nght
next to thefrontdoor (R261:119).
On 22 June 1999, Robin was driving on Highway 89 when she turned to see
defendant driving parallel with her (R261:59). Defendant drove next to Robin for a
while, staring at her the whole time (R261:60). Robin, who was originally headed
towards AATC, changed her route so that defendant would not know where she was
headed (R261:61-62). For a while, defendant and Robin went separate routes as
defendant took a different turn off from Highway 89 than did Robin (id.). Moments
later, however, defendant met up with Robin (id.). Robin drove into an Albertson's
parking lot because it was a well lit place (id.).
"Robin [] [is] a lying bitch "
Remaining inside her car, Robin called 911 from her cell phone (R262:171).
Meanwhile, defendant went into Pack Mail, a nearby business (id.). Officer Bingham
responded to Robin's 911 call (id.). Officer Bingham spoke briefly with Robin and
noticed that defendant was in Pack Mail, staring at him and Robin through the window
(id.). While Robin left the area and headed for AATC, Officer Bingham contacted
defendant (id.). Defendant claimed that he was returning from Layton and had just
dropped off an individual (R262:174). When Officer Bingham asked defendant why he
had taken such a "round about way to get back to Pack Mail/' defendant "started to cuss

8

and swear and use profanity"; specifically, defendant called Robin, %4a lying bitch"
(R262:174).
Around August 1999, defendant's visits to the AATC parking lot accelerated
(R261:125). Defendant would go into the dry cleaners next door to AATC "without
anything and come back without anything" (R261:125). Other times, defendant would
just drive through the AATC parking lot and just stare inside AATC (id.).
On 25 August 1999, defendant signed a diversion agreement with South Ogden
City that he would not initiate any further contact with Robin (R261:22-23).
il

[T]he employees had [] the door locked. They [were] obviously scared"

On 20 December, South Ogden police responded to another complaint about
defendant from AATC. Officer Shultz went to the business to speak with Robin
(R262:193). Upon his arrival he observed that all of the employees were "obviously
scared" and that he had to wait for them to unlock thefrontdoor (R262:194). While
Officer Shultz was speaking with the employees, "defendant came up to the window and
peered in" (id.). When Officer Shultz contacted defendant outside AATC, defendant
"became kind of antagonistic, wanting to know what we [were] doing up there and what
our business was and if it involved him" (R262:194-195). When Officer Nelson
informed defendant that he needed to go, defendant "became real standoffish. He got [in
the officer's] face a little bit

He[] escalated the situation and just put his hands on his

hips. He started to yell, to cause a scene and like was there to de-escalate the situation
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and I just pretty much just told him to go" (R162:195). Defendant told the officer he was
going to "grab his signs and picket" which he proceeded to do (R262:196). The officer
allowed defendant to picket and did not "bother [defendant] or [] have "contact with him
again while he was picketing" (id.). According to Officer Shultz, South Ogden police
"always had another officer" accompany them whenever it was necessary to deal with
[defendant], "just to stand by in case something did happen because of the
unpredictability and just to keep everything at a professional level" (id.).
"Oh my God, he's got a gun "
Three days later, on 23 December 1999, defendant again drove into AATC's
parking lot (R262:154-155). Defendant parked his white Acura behind Robin's car, with
the trunk of his car facing AATC (R262:80). Defendant got out of his Acura and walked
into the dry cleaners next door to AATC (R261:130-131). Defendant carried nothing
with him as he entered and later exited the dry cleaners (id.). When defendant returned
to his car he "flipped the trunk switch" from the driver's side door (R261:132).
Defendant then walked around the passenger side, opened the door and took out a gun"
(id.). One of Robin's employees screamed "Oh my God, he's got a gun. Robin he's got
a gun, call the police, call them now, be careful" (R261:76). Defendant held "the handle
[of the gun] in his right hand and the barrel in his left hand . . . the barrel [was] hanging
down" (R261:133, 161). One of defendant's employees thought it looked like a sawed-

10

off shot gun (R262:158). Defendant "looked toward Robin's office," before putting the
gun in his trunk and driving away (R261:134, 159).
Based on the "gun" incident, Officer Ruth obtained a warrant for defendant's
arrest on a charge of stalking:
While I was on the scene I knew that it had gotten too far where a gun had
been produced. I needed some kind of assistance from the county
attorney's office and again I had prepared all of these prior incidents and
[was] aware of everything that was going on with [defendant] and Robin []
and her employees. So I contacted the county attorney's office by phone
while on the scene with [AATC].
(R262:211). Defendant was arrested later that day while picketing AATC (R262:213).
A pistol-grip shot gun was located in the trunk of defendant's car (id.) (see Exh. #1).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point L Defendant's alarming conduct in moving a shot gun from the passenger
compartment of his car to the trunk in full view of anyone inside AATC, and while
Robin's car was present, is sufficient to establish that he used a dangerous weapon to
stalk Robin, particularly where this incident capped months of his stalking Robin at
AATC and explicitly threatening her physical safety.
Point II. The jury was correctly instructed that exhibiting a dangerous weapon
"in such a manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person" constitutes use of a
dangerous weapon. The jury instruction is consistent with pertinent and controlling
statutory definitions and case law.

11

Point III Defendant's First Amendment challenge to the stalking statute should
be rejected for two reasons: First, defendant's inadequate analysis does not and cannot
demonstrate that the stalking statute infringes constitutionally protected conduct; second,
he does not and cannot demonstrate on this record that the stalking charge encompassed
any constitutionally protected activity, i.e., defendant's picketing and legitimate
patronage of businesses near AATC did not serve as the basis for the stalking charge or
conviction here.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
DEFENDANT USED A DANGEROUS WEAPON WHERE
DEFENDANT MOVED A PISTOL-GRIP SHOT GUN FROM THE
PASSENGER COMPARTMENT OF HIS CAR TO THE TRUNK, IN
FULL VIEW OF ANYONE WATCHING FROM INSIDE AATC
Stalking is a second degree felony "if the offenderf] use[s] a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601 [.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(6)(a) (1999).

UTAH

CODE ANN. § 76-l-601(5)(a)(ii) (1999), in turn provides that "'dangerous weapon'
means[] any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury;... and[] the actor
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an
item."
In Point I of his brief, defendant claims there is insufficient evidence that he used
a dangerous weapon to stalk Robin; therefore, his conviction should be reduced to a class

12

A misdemeanor. Aplt. Br. at 13-17. The trial court rejected defendant's sufficiency
challenge on the ground that his conduct, in moving a pistol-grip shot gunfromthe
passenger compartment to the trunk of his car in full view of anyone watching from
inside AATC clearly fell within the purview of the stalking statute and justified the
enhanced second degree felony charge. This Court should do likewise.
Proceedings below. After the State rested, and outside the presence of the jury,
defendant moved to reduce the second degree felony stalking charge to a class A
misdemeanor (R262:235). Defendant claimed that his conduct in moving the shotgun
from the passenger compartment to the trunk of his car within view of Robin's
employees did not amount to use of a weapon for purposes of stalking (R262:236).
Defendant further complained that he did not "engage in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person" because only Robin's employees saw him exhibit his shotgun
(R262:237). Finally, defendant claimed that his one-time exhibition of the shotgun was
insufficient: "course of conduct is defined as repeatedly which means you would have to
have the weapon used more than once and in this case, we have a weapon used one time"
(R262:238).
The trial court denied defendant's motion to reduce the stalking charge to a
misdemeanor:
I'm going to deny that motion as well for the following reasons; this
particular crime is characterized as being a constellation of events, by its
very definition that it's a course of conduct. I think for me to interpret the
statute to require that a weapon be used at two or more times in order for it
13

to rise to the level of a second degree felony would be outside the common
sense nature of the crime itself because it's a constellation of conduct and I
think it's not just one thing, it's many things and that's exactly what it's
described as in order for it to be, in fact, a stalking violation.
As far as the victim never seeing the gun, I recognize that this case
distinguishes itself from the case the State is relying on [In re R.G.B., 597
P.2d 1333 (Utah 1979)], in that this was a direct contact with the victim.
The gun was, although not pointed, shot, brandished in any way, it was in
this person's front pants with the handle exposed therefore making it clear
that it was available for use.
This is one step removed in the sense that it deals with the situation
or that she's not directly in view of it, but it's not an unreasonable step to
also assume that since it was her place of business where she ordinarily
was, her car was in the parking lot, that she was there and would find out
about it because there were employees that obviously saw it and we can
assume [defendant] may have known that. At least it's certainly subject to
argument.
Course of conduct implies threats implied by conduct and that's
included under the course of conduct definition. It doesn't specifically say
the person has to be in direct line with the weapon. It doesn't have to say
they have to view it. This is a different kind of a case, right, and I think I
hinge mainly on arguments of counsel frankly, unlike a lot of cases where
it's just simply a matter of determining what actually happened. It's clear
what happened here, the question is intentional knowing, those types of
things. I'm going to deny the motion.
And I'm specifically going to put this on the record because in case
there is a review of this, I'm specifically relying on the guidance from the
Utah Supreme Court in making my decision in the case of [R.G.B.] where it
was the only case that I'm aware of where it specifically addressed the
issue of use of a firearm.
Frankly, I've seen it referred to actual use of a firearm, use of a
firearm and frankly it's not real, there's no definition in the statute of what
use of firearm is, but this case I think makes clear in the statement, if
merely exhibiting the gun creates fear in the victim, it constitutes use of a
firearm for that purpose. I'm relying on that statement in making my
14

decision. I just want them to know that so they can give me credit at least
for relying on [precedent]. That's what I'm relying on in terms of allowing
it to go forward.
Obviously, the facts are fairly clear. The gun was not pointed.
That's undisputed. The gun was not pointed. It was not used in any
fashion other than exposed for a period of time, not in what could be, I
guess, argued as a threatening manner, but was exposed just as having a
gun in your belt probably could be argued as not a threatening manner
similar to this case, it was found to have been in use. That's the best I can
do.
(R262:241-243) (a copy of the oral ruling is contained in addendum A).
A.

Defendant Has Not Marshaled Evidence That He Used A Dangerous
Weapon to Stalk Robin.

As a general rule, a defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper
motion or objection to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^f
14-17, 10 P.3d 346. Here, as set forth above, defendant preserved his sufficiency
challenge; however, his allegations fail to establish insufficiency.2
While defendant admits that he moved a "dangerous weapon" or "firearm" from
the passenger compartment of his car to the trunk in full view of AATC employees, see
Aplt. Br. at 14-15, he omits additional evidence that he parked directly behind Robin's
car in the parking lot, with his trunk in full view of AATC, and that he "looked toward
Robin's office," before putting the gun in his trunk and driving away" (R261.134, 159).

2

While defendant raised his sufficiency claim below, he did not do so in the
context of a motion to arrest judgment (R262:235). Defendant's motion to arrest
judgement focused solely on his constitutional challenge to the stalking statute {see
R323-236), which claim is addressed in Point III of the State's brief.
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He also omits evidence that this was not a small or concealed gun, but rather, that he held
"the handle [of the gun] in his right hand and the barrel in his left hand . . . the barrel
[was] hanging down," and that one of Robin's employees thought it looked like a sawedoff shot gun (R261:133, 161) (R262:158). Finally, defendant fails to acknowledge this
incident capped months of his stalking Robin and explicitly threatening her physical
safety {see, e.g., Supp. Record) (a copy of the supplemental record is contained in
addendum B).
Accordingly, defendant's sufficiency challenge falls short of his burden to
marshal the evidence that he used a dangerous weapon. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT
44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.2d 1108 (explaining same marshaling requirement for challenging trial
court's findings); Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). Indeed,
marshaling requires the defendant to gather all the evidence that supports the verdict and
then explain how that evidence is not enough to sustain the conviction. See Gamblin, at
f 17 n.2. "Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position," by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings
the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co. ,818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah App. 1991). After gathering "this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. Defendant's failure to
marshal the supporting evidence that he used a dangerous weapon is alone grounds to
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reject his insufficiency claim. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,1f 16, 989 P.2d 1065;
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). See also Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that failure to marshal "is
grounds alone to reject" a sufficiency challenge).
B.

Evidence That Defendant Brandished a Pistol-grip Shot Gun in Full
View of AATC Employees is Sufficient to Support his Second Degree
Felony Stalking Conviction.

In any event, defendant's sufficiency challenge is entirely premised on his selfserving interpretation of the stalking statute. Rather than look to the pertinent statutory
explanation of what it means to use a dangerous weapon in section 76-1-601, as directed
by the stalking statute, defendant looks to non-controlling or irrelevant authority and
claims that his conduct in moving the pistol-grip shot gun from "one location in his
vehicle to another location" did not amount to using a dangerous weapon. Aplt. Br. at
14-15 (citing e.g., People v. Chambers, 498 P.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Ca. 1972)).
Section 76-1 -601 (5)(a)(ii), however, provides that "'dangerous weapon' means[]
any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury;... and[] the actor represents
to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item." Here,
defendant's alarming conduct in inexplicably moving the pistol-grip shot gunfromthe
passenger compartment to the trunk in full view of anyone inside AATC reasonably
represented to those watching that defendant "[was] in control of [the shot gun]." Id.
See also In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 1979) (affirming aggravated robbery
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conviction on evidence that "merely exhibiting the gun create[d] fear in the victim," and
thus constituted "'use of afirearm'for that purpose").
Even under defendant's authorities, however, his conduct amounts to using a
dangerous weapon. Aplt. Br. at 15 (citing e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137
(1995)). The issue in Bailey was the sufficiency of evidence that Bailey used a firearm in
connection with drug trafficking. In the course of a traffic stop, police uncovered
narcotics, and a large amount of cash and a loaded 9-mm. pistol in Bailey's trunk. Id. at
139. The pertinent federal statute required evidence of use a firearm, which the Supreme
Court determined to mean "active employment" of a firearm. Id. at 148. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court declined to extend the definition of use or active employment of a
firearm to encompass Bailey's situation: "If the gun is not disclosed or mentioned by the
offender, it is not actively employed, and it is not 'used.'" Id. at 149.
While, "the inert presence of a firearm, without more," is insufficient, under
Bailey, defendant ignores the Supreme Court's further recognition that "active
employment" or use "certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with,
and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm." Id. at 149. Indeed, Bailey
emphasizes that "even an offender's reference to a firearm in his possession could
satisfy" the federal statute: "Thus, a reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a
change in the circumstances of the predicate offense is a 'use,' just as the silent but
obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a 'use.'"
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In sharp contrast to Bailey's situation (caught trafficking with a pistol stowed in
the trunk of his car), defendant actively displayed his pistol-grip shot gun in full view of
AATC employees {see. e.g., R261:76, 133-134, 158-159, 161, 211). Defendant's
brandishing constitutes "use" under both section 76-601-1 and Bailey, precisely because
the brandishing was calculated to further alarm and frighten Robin and her employees
(id.). Defendant's sufficiency challenge should be rejected.
POINT II
THE JURY WAS CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THAT
"EXHIBITING" A DANGEROUS WEAPON "IN SUCH A
MANNER THAT IT CREATES FEAR IN A REASONABLE
PERSON" CONSTITUTES USE OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON
Jury Instruction 34 provides as follows:
Use of a dangerous weapon is defined as bringing or putting it into service
or action or to put it to some purpose. If you find that a firearm is a
dangerous weapon in this case, then its use may include, but is not limited
to the following: pointing it at a person, shooting it, or exhibiting it in such
a manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person.
(R163).
In Point II of his brief, defendant complains that this instruction is incorrect, based
on his strained construction of Bailey in Point I of his brief. Aplt. Br. at 18. For reasons
set forth in Point I, supra, the State submits that defendant's reliance on Bailey is
misplaced. Indeed, section 76-1-601(5) (defining use of a dangerous weapon as
including a representation that the defendant is in control of the dangerous weapon) and
R.G.B., 597 P.2d at 1335 (recognizing that mere exhibition of a weapon during a robbery
is sufficient to convict for aggravated robbery), control this issue. Consistent with
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section 76-1 -601 (5) and R.G.B., jury instruction 34 properly mstruc: hat "exhibiting" a
dangerous weapon "in such a manner that it creates fear in a reasonable person"
constitutes use of a dangerous weapon (R163). Finally, as further set forth supra, the
Bailey definition, properly construed, is consistent with both section 76-1-601(5) and
R.G.B. because Bailey's definition of use of a weapon encompasses "brandishing" and
"displaying." Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148. Thus, defendant's meritless challenge to jury
instruction 34 fails even under his own faulty analysis.
POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY CONVICTED FOR
STALKING AFTER HE REPEATEDLY APPEARED IN THE
PUBLIC PARKING LOT OUTSIDE ROBIN'S BUSINESS FOR NO
APPARENTLY LEGITIMATE PURPOSE AND THREATENED
HER PHYSICAL SAFETY, INCLUDING EXHIBITING A PISTOLGRIP SHOT GUN
In Point III of his brief, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the stalking
statute, claiming that it is both vague and overbroad. Aplt Br. at 19-28. Defendant's
constitutional challenge hinges on his assertion that the stalking statute infringes his First
Amendment rights to free expression, or to picket, and to patronize other local
businesses. Aplt. Br. at 24-28. Defendant's claim should be rejected for two reasons:
First, defendant's inadequate analysis does not and cannot demonstrate that the stalking
statute facially infringes constitutionally protected conduct; second, he does not and
cannot demonstrate that as applied to him, the stalking statute encompassed any
constitutionally protected activity, i.e., defendant's picketing and legitimate patronage of
nearby businesses did not serve as the basis for the stalking charge and conviction here.
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Proceedings Below, At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved to
dismiss the stalking charge alleging that the stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad (R262:218-235). The crux of defendant's oral argument was that while
Robin had obtained protective orders against him two years earlier, they had been
dismissed with prejudice in 1998 (R262:222, 225-227). Also, a diversion agreement he
entered with South Ogden City (see R241-242), only prevented him from initiating
contact with Robin and did not expressly require him to stay awayfromthe AATC
parking lot (R262:227-228). Defendant thus concluded that as a result of the dismissed
protective orders and the diversion agreement, his conduct was "allowed in essence," and
that the stalking statute was accordingly overbroad and vague as applied to him: "[H]e
can't conform or doesn't know exactly what he needs to do to conform his conduct[.]"
(R262:228-229).
The trial court pointed out that the stalking statute required a knowing and
intentional mental state which appeared to defeat defendant's claims of vagueness and
overbreadth:
Isn't that a defense to this? Simply a defense that based upon the, you
know, the earlier proceedings and all that, or just based upon the argument
generally, that you know, people have the right to come and go as they
please, pretty much in this society and, you know, and it goes to his intent
whether he even knew he was [d]oing something wrong. Doesn't it go to a
question of fact more than anything though in this case?
(R262:229-230). Defendant acknowledged that the stalking statute had previously been
declared constitutional in Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1997), and
attempted to distinguish Lopez by asserting that
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he's been given indications from judges which are the ultimate authorities
as to what he can and cannot do, so to speak, and he relies upon those and
now the county attorney files criminal charges against him for doing
exactly what he was not prohibited form doing in both that order and in the
diversion agreement.
(R262:230).
At the trial court's request the prosecutor explained her contrary understanding as
to why the civil protective orders were dismissed:
I review all of those documents and I was aware that they were filed. They
were filed by [Robin's attorney] and my understanding was, not to
disparage him, but that he hadn't quite done his j o b . . . . He represented
[Robin] as she sought those civil protective orders. I mean he spelled
[defendant's] name wrong on all of the complaints and frankly they were
difficult to find because—looking them in that matter. I don't know the
basis for the attorney's fees (inaudible) as they were ordered
(R262:231). At the prosecutor's request, Robin further explained that she paid her
attorney $1,000 "to help me and he called me up after. He said, I did this all wrong.
They threw it out for stupid reasons and I'm going to pay the 900 or 800 bucks and I'm
sorry. And I said you know what a thousand bucks was nothing, I just wanted the
protections, so your apology doesn't help. That's basically what I said" (R262:231-232).
The prosecutor continued that although the civil protective orders were
unsuccessful, Robin "continued to contact the police and sought other avenues"of help:
To say that [defendant] was not on notice that there was a stalking statute
or that his behavior was unwanted or that he may (inaudible) prosecution
for that is obviously not true.
Now Judge Lyon may have dismissed two civil protection orders,
but I doubt that Judge Lyon patted [defendant] on the back on his way out
the door and said you keep doing what you're doing. You go hang out in
that parking lot and, you know, if it bugs her, life's hard, she'll get over it.
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I doubt Judge Lyon said that. I bet he dismissed it based on the stipulation
and that was it.
For [defendant] to walk out of there assuming that this conduct then
became legitimate and welcomed and was not going to be the subject of
further litigation or further criminal proceedings was obviously, if he left
that day with that understanding, every time South Ogden approached him
or every time the police contacted him, he should have been on notice that
maybe it wasn't welcome, maybe it was unwanted and maybe he was going
to be in trouble because of it. They distinctly told him to stay away from
her. The diversion agreement was part of it and he was represented by
[counsel]. Jeff Nelson specifically testified today that a week before the
Winger's incident, he told [defendant] if he pursued that course of conduct
he might be charged with stalking. That right there is notice enough. The
statute is in the book and we assume that people know what the statutes are
(R262:232-233).
Defense counsel reiterated that the dismissal of the protective orders with
prejudice ought be viewed in a light favorable to defendant's position (R262:233).
The trial court observed that even if defendant's characterization of the dismissed
protective orders was plausible, it did not mean that defendant's subsequent conduct was
justified (R262:233-234). Defense counsel acknowledged that it "was a very fine line,"
but that defendant's behavior was not that of the stereotypical stalker "that's standing
outside the bedroom window of somebody at night"(R262:234). He also reiterated his
argument that "a couple of courts . . . say you (defendant) can continue on . . . "
(R262:234).
The trial court disputed defense counsel's characterization of the other courts and
denied the motion:
I'm going to deny your motion on the constitutionality issue. I think
the statute does set forth specific and actually very clear conduct that is
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required. It also sets forth a [mens red] that is intentional or knowingly and
it also puts it in the standard of what a reasonable person would perceived
and I think all those are facts specific to any given case.
I would agree with you. I think this is a somewhat unusual case and
its certainly subject to a great deal of advocacy, I think, and argument to the
jury and a certainly has a lot of factual issues, I think, that need to be
resolved by the jury and I think we can instruct clearly to the point where
on the statute you have many arguments that you can make.
(R262:235) (a copy of the oral ruling is contained in addendum C).
Defendant raised his constitutional challenge to the stalking statute again in a
post-trial motion for arrest of judgment (R230-236) (R263:1-3). The State filed an
opposing memorandum, pointing out that the State did not rely on defendant's picketing
at AATC as the basis for the stalking charge (R249). In oral argument, the State
reminded the Court that just three days after one of the protective orders was dismissed
defendant made threatening statements at Winger's restaurant (R263:5) {See Supp.
Record). Moreover, police repeatedly told defendant to stop stalking Robin or he would
be charged (R.263:5).
The trial court reaffirmed its prior ruling and denied the motion: "... I don't see
that this deviates in any significant way to cause me to review that statute and basically
overturn the Court of Appeals on it. It's denied" (R263:6), add. C.
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A.

Defendant's Inadequate Argument Identifies No Offending Word or
Phrase in the Stalking Statute; Nor Does it Demonstrate That the
Instant Stalking Charge Encompasses Any Constitutionally Protected
Conduct

Defendant's constitutional challenge to the stalking statute is inadequately briefed.
While defendant's 10-page argument recites the stalking statute and his case authority
cites the pertinent legal framework, defendant wholly fails to identify any word or phrase
in the stalking statute which renders it overbroad and vague. See Aplt. Br. at 20-28.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate procedure, provides that the argument portion of
an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presentedf.]) (emphasis added). In lieu of meaningful analysis of the
statutory language defendant substitutes bald conclusion, broadly alleging that the
stalking statute "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden." Aplt. Br. at 23-27.
Additionally, defendant blatantly asserts that his stalking conviction is based on
his picketing AATC and patronizing nearby businesses. Aplt. Br. at 24-27. Defendant
does not ground this claim with citation to the record, as further required by rule 24(a)(9)
(appellant to include citations to the "parts of the record relied on"). Nor could he. As
demonstrated above, the evidence and the prosecutor's statements to the trial court make
plain that both Robin and law enforcement tolerated defendant's picketing and that
defendant's picketing and patronage of nearby businesses did not serve as the basis for
the instant stalking charge and conviction {see, e.g., (R249), (R261:36-38, 43, 48-62, 76,
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130-133, 125),(R262:80, 154-155, 158-159, 174, 196), (R263:5), (Supp. Record)).
Rather, as set forth in the Statement of the Facts, supra, defendant's stalking conviction
rests on abundant evidence of his inappropriate and threatening conduct, including the
numerous times he was present in the AATC parking lot for no apparent legitimate
purpose, his threatening behavior at the Winger's restaurant, his following Robin on
Highway 89, and finally, his alarming behavior the day of his arrest when he displayed a
pistol-grip shot gun in the AATC parking lot in a "manner" to suggest "that he [was] in
control" of the weapon (id.). See section 76-1-601.
Defendant's twin failures to provide meaningful analysis of his constitutional
claims and to ground his claim in the existing record are sufficient reasons in themselves
to reject his constitutional challenges to the stalking statute. See State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)
(declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal
analysis and authority to support his argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549
(UtahApp. 1998) (same).
B.

Salt Lake City v. Lopez Rejected Similar Overbreadth and Vagueness
Challenges to the Stalking Statute and is Dispositive Here.

Even overlooking defendant's inadequate briefing, Lopez is dispositive of
defendant claims that the stalking statute is overbroad and vague as applied to him. Aplt.
Br. at 27. Defendant's conclusory attempt to distinguish Lopez, where this Court
rejected similar vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the stalking statute, is
unavailing.
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Lopez was told by his juvenile victim, her parents, and the juvenile victim's
attorney, that his romantic interest was unwanted and should cease. Lopez, 935 P.2d at
1261. When Lopez persisted, the juvenile victim obtained a no-contact order. Id.
Despite these efforts, Lopez continued to contact her in public settings and was
ultimately charged and convicted for stalking. Id. On appeal, Lopez challenged the
constitutionality of the stalking statute, claiming that it "infring[ed] on his constitutional
freedoms of association and movement... and fail[ed] to define 'emotional distress'[.]"
Lopez, 935?.2d aX\262.
Overbreadth. Before analyzing Lopez's challenge, the Court observed that "[A]
statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad unless it renders unlawful a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at 1262 (citing Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d
1372, 1375 (Utah App. 1990). Moreover, if conduct "and not merely speech is
involved," "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plain legitimate sweep." Id. (citing Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
The Court then proceeded to reject Lopez's claim of facial overbreadth, pointing
out that Utah's stalking statute required a "course of conduct" "directed at causing
another person emotional distress." Id. at 1263 (citations omitted). Therefore, the
stalking statute did not encompass "[l]imited contact during legitimate innocent
encounters . . . without conduct directed at causing physical harm or emotional distress to
an intended person[.]" Id. at 1263-1264. The Court emphasized that the emotional
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distress element of stalking "is not satisfied by causing mere anxiety or annoyance." Id.
at 1264. Rather, looking to the well established tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, this Court applied the civil definition: "Emotional distress results from conduct
that is 'outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality." Id. (citing Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896,
905 (Utah 1992)). Thus, innocent conduct, such as picking up a child for visitation
purposes or attending a child's performance "do not rise to the level of outrageous and
intolerable conduct that would reasonably cause 'emotional distress.'" Id. at 1263-1264.
Rather, the stalking statute "is narrowly drafted to restrict only threatening
behavior, with limited infringement onrightsto free association and movement." Id. at
1264. This means that
conduct is not criminal unless it is repeated (specifically defined as two or
more occasions), and the defendant 'intentionally or knowingly engages in
a course of conduct' that is 'directed at a specific person' such that a
'reasonable person' would suffer emotional distress, and the defendant
knows or should know that the specific person will suffer emotional
distress.
Id. (quoting section 76-5-106.5(2)). The Court concluded that "[t]he restrictions this
statute may impose on a person's ability to move about and associate freely are limited
and justified by the state's compelling interest in protecting its citizens from threatening
or harmful behavior." Id. In so concluding, the Court further noted that "[t]he facial
overbreadth doctrine is [] limited" and "attenuates further as the prohibited behavior
moves from pure speech towards conduct that, even if expressive, may be properly
restricted as a legitimate state interest." Id.
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The Court also rejected Lopez's claim of overbreadth as applied because Lopez
"persisted in making untoward contact with [the juvenile victim] after he knew that [she]
and her parents did not want him to contact her." Id. He persisted even after being
contacted by a private attorney and after the issuance of a no-contact order. Id.
Therefore, Lopez "was not prosecuted for merely being in [the victim's] presence; he
was prosecuted for causing emotional distress" and engaging in behavior directed at her
that could reasonably be understood as threatening." Id.
Vagueness. Having rejected Lopez's claims of overbreadth, the Court similarly
disposed of his claim of vagueness. Id. The Court reiterated that "emotional distress" is
well defined in Utah; therefore, "the definition's absence"fromthe stalking statute "does
not render the statute unconstitutionally vague." Id. Moreover, a defendant's
"knowledge" that his conduct threatened or distressed the victim is an element of the
crime of stalking. Id. (citing section 76-5-106.5(2)(a)). Accordingly, the stalking statute
could not "mislead a person of common intelligence into misunderstanding what is
prohibited." Id. (quoting State v. Cuomo, 642 A.2d 90, 98 (Conn. Supp. 1993)).
The Court pointed out that unlike an overbreadth analysis, a vagueness analysis
begins with an examination of the defendant's conduct "before analyzing hypothetical
applications of the law." Id. at 1265 (quoting Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817
P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-495 (1982))). Because Lopez knew his victim "did not
want contact with him," and because he persisted in that contact even after being ordered
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to cease, he could not claim the stalking statute was vague as applied to him, "let alone
that the statute was totally invalid and incapable of any valid application." Id.
Recognizing that this Court rejected Lopez's claims that the stalking statute was
overbroad and vague, both facially and as applied to Lopez, Aplt. Br. at 27, defendant
attempts to distinguish Lopez on the ground that Lopez "did not address a situation . . .
where [a] legitimate, protected, First Amendment right was at issue[.] . .. Lopez did not
involve an individual exercising his right to picket a business or frequent particular
businesses in an area where he may not be wanted." Aplt. Br. at 24-25. In other words,
defendant claims that while the statute was not overbroad and vague as applied to Lopez,
it is overbroad and vague as applied to him. Aplt. Br. at 27.
Contrary to defendant's blanket assertion, and as demonstrated above, Lopez did
in fact involve similar claims that the stalking statute infringes first amendment
freedoms, albeit association and movement. Defendant's conclusory observation
provides no legally significant reason to distinguish the result in Lopez from this case.
Both Lopez and defendant conducted their stalking in public places and their conduct
falls within the purview of the stalking statute, not because they were innocently
exercising their first amendment freedoms, but because their threatening conduct was
"directed at" causing "emotional distress to an intended person." Lopez, 935 P.2d 126364. Thus, the stalking statute was not overbroad as applied to either Lopez or defendant.
Moreover, defendant's cursory analysis fails to acknowledge the specific intent
requirement of the stalking statute, let alone this Court's determination that that

30

requirement "vitiates" any claim that the statute "could mislead a person of common
intelligence into misunderstanding what is prohibited." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265
(quotation omitted). Thus, because defendant has not and cannot show that the statute is
vague as applied to him, there is no need to consider whether it is vague on its face. Id.
In sum, defendant's overbreadth and vagueness challenges fail because he cannot
demonstrate, on this record, that the instant charge encompassed any constitutionally
protected conduct. Moreover, he cannot meaningfully distinguish Lopez. Defendant
thus fails to demonstrate that the stalking statute is overbroad, either facially or as
applied, or that it is so vague he could not understand that his threatening conduct was
prohibited.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, defendant's claims of insufficiency, jury instruction error,
and constitutional deficiency should be rejected and his jury conviction for stalking
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 3 _ July 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

31

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on 3 July 2002,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two copies
of the foregoing Brief ofAppellee to the following:
RONALD J. YENGICH
VANESSA RAMOS-SMITH
YENGICH, RICH & XAIX
175 East 400 South, Ste. 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

32

Addenda

Addendum A

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 991905379 MO

Plaintiff
Appellate Case No. 20001056 - CA
v
Volume II of II
ANDREW WEISBERG,
Defendant.

JURY TRIAL OCTOBER 25 and 26,2000
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRJB1
1775 Ellen Way
FF8 0 9 2001
Sandy,Utah84092
- ° U 3 <UU1

JFILED

801-523-1186

COURT OF APPEALS

par<mg -it with the most menacing of the weapons tr.at ne
The rest of them are handguns.

There's one other rifle.

r.~s.
He

picks the shotgun to be in her parking lot with for no good
reason.

That's what the jury needs to hear.

to menace and threaten her?
stalking?

Was that gun used

Was that gun used to escalate the

That's exactly the purpose for that and that's what

the jury needs to hear about and that's what the jury needs to
decide.

The jury may decide it doesn't rise to the level, but

that should be the jury's decision and for this Court to say,
no reasonable jury can prove that/ I think is beyond that.
That's the evidence that's in and that's the evidence the Court
needs to look at.
THE COURT:

Any reply?

MR. RICHARDS:
THE COURT:

I'd submit it, Judge.

I'm going to deny that motion as well for

the following reasons; this particular crime is characterized
as being a constellation of events, by its very definition that
it's a course of conduct.

I think for me to interpret the

statute to require that a weapon be used at two or more times
in order for it to rise to the level of a second degree felony
would be outside the common sense nature of the crime itself
because it's a constellation of conduct and I think it's not
just one thing, it's many things and that's exactly what it's
described as in order for it to be, in fact, a stalking
violation.

1

As far as the victim never seeing the gun, I

2

recognize that this case distinguishes itself from the case the

3

State is relying on in the interest of RGB, 597 Pacific Second

4

1333, in that this was a direct contact with the victim.

5

gun was, although not pointed, shot, brandished in any way, it

6

was in this person's front pants with the handle exposed

The

7 ; therefore making it clear that it was available for use.
8

l

9

This is one step removed in the sense that it deals
with the situation or that she's not directly in view of it,

10 , but it's not an unreasonable step to also assume that since it
11

was her place of business where she ordinarily was, her car was

12

in the parking lot, that she was there and would find out about

13 j it because there were employees that obviously saw it and we
14 ! can assume Mr. Weisberg may have known that.

At least it's

15 J certainly subject to argument.
I
16 !

Course of conduct implies threats implied by conduct

17 I and that's included under the course of conduct definition.

It

18 : doesn't specifically say the person has to be in direct line
19 < with the weapon.

It doesn't have to say they have to view it.

20 j This is a different kind of a case, right, and I think will
21 i hinge mainly on arguments of counsel frankly, unlike a lot of
22

cases where it's just simply a matter of determining what

23

actually happened.

It's clear what happened here, the question

24 ! is intentional knowing, those types of things.
2 5 i deny the motion.

I'm going to

And I'm specifically going to put c m s on the re::::
because in case there is a review of this, I'm specifically
relying on the guidance from the Utah Supreme Court in making
my decision in the case of in re; the interest of RGB, 597
Pacific Second 1333 where it was the only case that I'm aware
of where it specifically addressed the issue of use of a
firearm.
Frankly, I've seen it referred to actual use of a
firearm, use of a firearm and frankly it's not real, there's no
definition in the statute of what use of a firearm is, but this
case I think makes clear in the statement, if merely exhibiting
the gun creates fear in the victim, it constitutes use of a
firearm for that purpose.
making my decision.

I'm relying on that statement in

I just want them to know that so they can

give me credit at least for relying on president.

That's what

I'm relying on in terms of allowing it to go forward.
Obviously, the facts are fairly clear.
not pointed.

That's undisputed.

The gun was

The gun was not pointed.

It

was not used in any fashion other than exposed for a period of
time, not in what could be, I guess, argued as a threatening
manner, but it was exposed just as having a gun in your belt
probably could be argued as not a threatening manner similar to
this case, it was found to have been in use.

That's the best I

can do.
MR. RICHARDS:

All right.

Judge, I would like to
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER

Plaintiff,

Case Number: 991905379
Appellate Case No: 20001056-CA

vs.

ANDREW WEISBERG,

Judge Pamela G. Heffeman

Defendant.

Attached is a Stipulated Supplement to the Record in this case. The Stipulated
Supplement shall constitute a complete supplement to the record on appeal.

DATED this

ruary, 2002.

•LA G^HEFFE
District Court Judge

ORDER
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Marian Decker
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor
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Camille L. Neider
Weber County Attorney's Office
2380 Washington Boulevard
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Ronald J. Yengich
Attorney for Defendant
175 East 400 South #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LULL
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2380 Washington Boulevard
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATED SUPPLEMENT TO
THE RECORD

vs.
CASE NO. 991905379

ANDREW WEISBERG,
Defendant.

JUDGE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Remandfromthe
Utah Court of Appeals, the State, represented by Camille L. Neider, and Defendant, represented
by Ronald J. Yengich, stipulate to the following supplement to the record:
1.

On October 25, 2000, Dennis Porter testified to the following:

Mr. Porter works for Sun Valley Mortgage. Through his work he was acquainted with
the Defendant and Robin Archibald. On April 6, 2000, Mr. Porter was having lunch at Winger's
Restaurant on Harrison Blvd. with co-workers Rich Pliippen and Brook Domingaez. Mr. Porter
initially saw through the window of the restaurant, that Defendant was in the parking lot. Mr.
Porter saw him drive by thefrontof the restaurant 2 or 3 times. Mr. Porter and his party had
been served their food and were eating. Mr. Porter saw Ms. Archibald seated a couple of booths
away with one of the employees from her office. Ms. Archibald had her back to Mr. Porter's
table After Mr Porter saw Defendant in the parking lot, Defendant abruptly came and sat at Mr
Porter's table. Mr Porter's party had no plans to meet Defendant at the restaurant, nor had they

invited Defendant to sit with them. Mr Porter observed that Defendant was acting very unusual,
that Defendant was much more agitated that he had ever seen him before. Defendant immediately
started talking about Ms. Archibald in a very loud voice. Defendant stated that he recognized Ms
Archibald's car and that he believed he had bought it. Defendant made several statements about
what he would like to see happen to Ms. Archibald. Defendant stated, T d like to hire some
black me to brutally rape her," and then stated, "No, she'd probably enjoy it." Defendant also
stated that "If she were alone, I'd run her over with my truck and then I would back over her to
make sure the job was done " After making those statements, the waiter approached the table and
asked Defendant if he would like to order anything. Defendant stated loudly that he "would like
her severed head on a fucking platter" and gestured toward Ms. Archibald. After making these
statements, Defendant abruptly left the table and walked out of the restaurant. Mr. Porter
immediately went over to Ms. Archibald's table and informed her of Defendant's statements.
2.

The State and Defendant stipulated that, if called, Brook Dominguez and Rich Phippen
would testify to the same events that Mr. Porter testified to.

3

On October 25, 2000, Jennifer Williams testified to the following:
Ms Williams was employed by Avis & Archibald Title CompanyfromMay 1998 to

December 1999 as a receptionist at thefrontdesk. Ms. Williamsfirstsaw Defendant picketing
outside of the office 3 to 4 months after she started working there. After that, Ms. Williams saw
Defendant "all of the time" in the parking lot or on the street below the business. Ms. Williams
would keep track of the times that Defendant came to the parking lot or was nearby the business
She said that sometimes it was everyday, at other times it was every other day When Defendant
was in the parking lot he would do different things Sometimes Defendant would park by Ms.
Archibald's car and just sit there. Other times he would go into the dry cleaners empty handed

and come out empty handed. Defendant would also drive slowly infromof the business and just
stare into the office. Defendant was also in the parking lot on a number of those occasions,
picketing the company. December 23, 1999, was Ms. Williams' last day at Avis & Archibald.
Ms. Williams and some other employees were outside the office having a cigarette break when
Defendant pulled up in his car. Defendant parked next to Ms. Archibald's car and went into the
dry cleaners empty handed and came out empty handed. Ms. Williams was closest to Defendant's
car, although she was faced awayfromhim. Ms. Williams saw that the others she was with began
to act strangely in response to something behind her and everyone hurried into the business. Ms.
Williams followed the others inside where they told her that Defendant had a gun. Ms. Williams
did not see the gun because her back was to Defendant. Ms. Williams was scared of Defendant
because of the things he would do. She was terrified that he came to the parking lot so often.
Ms. Williams also stated that while working at thefrontdesk she received many hang-up phone
calls.
Dated this

1*

day of February, 2001.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

the constitutionality issue.

I'm going to deny yc^r -c:::r. ::.
I think the statute does set

forth specific and actually very clear conduct that is
required.

It also sets forth a Mansura that is intentional or

knowingly and it also puts it in the standard or what a
reasonable person would perceive and I think all those are
facts specific to any given case.

I would agree with you. I

think this is a somewhat unusual case and it's certainly
subject to a great deal of advocacy, I think, and argument to
the jury and certainly has a lot of factual issues, I think,
that need to be resolved by the jury and I think we can
instruct clearly to the point where on the statute you have
many arguments that you can make.
MR. RICHARDS:

My second motion then, I would move to

dismiss the second degree element of the stalking charge. In
other words, kick it down to the misdemeanor charge and I make
that motion on two grounds.

First, I have read the State in

the interest of RGB and this is a totally different case. In
RGB, number one, it's an aggravated robbery versus a stalking
case, but putting that aside, what happens in RGB is that this
fellow goes into the court, he's a juvenile - court, I've got
court on my mind - he goes into a store and he has a gun in his
belt.

Now, it says tucked in the front of his jeans and the

wording they use is that he goes into the shop, asks for all
the shop's money in a white paper bag, while revealing a gun
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1

call it a Motion to Arrest Judgment, I think is improper and

2

the State would ask that you dismiss that or deny the motion.

3

THE COURT: Anything else?

4

MR- RICHARDS:

This is addressing the Motion to

5

Arrest Judgment,

I think it is proper.

You read the statute,

6

you're allowed to make a motion to arrest judgment and that's

7

exactly what we've done.

8

constitutional reasons, factual reasons or any other reasons

You can do it either under

9 J the Court deems appropriate and I think this is an appropriate
10

deal and would ask that you dismiss.

11

THE COURT:

12

I'm going to deny the motion.

13

of appeal.

14

the statute has been thoroughly addressed up to this point by a

15

Court of Appeals, I don't see that this deviates in any

16

significant way to cause me to review that statute and

17

basically overturn the Court of Appeals on it.

18

Well, I have read both memorandum and
It's preserved for the purposes

I don't think the issue of the constitutionality of

It's denied.

This is the day set for sentencing and I have the

19

report in front of me.

I might note that I don't know if

20

you've seen some of the letters that have come in, but there

21

have been letters on Mr. Weisberg's behalf by a number of

22

people pointing out areas of his character that they wanted me

23

to know.

24

audience today.

25

to take a look at them if you'd like to see them.

I don't if there are any of these people in the
I've read the letters and I'd welcome counsel
I haven't
i
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Addendum D

76-5-106.5. Definitions - Stalking - Injunction - Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a
person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by conduct or a
combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person who
regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household within the prior six
months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person
that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will suffer emotional
distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his immediate family.
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a stalking
injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or intentionally or
knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section.
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor:
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a,
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the LexisNexis Group. All nghts reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.

Stalking Injunctions.
(5) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is substantially similar to the
offense of stalking;
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in another
jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the victim of the stalking or
a member of the victim's immediate family was also a victim of the previous felony offense; or
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection (7).
(6) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender:
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the crime of stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking;
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses
that ar substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under Subsection
(5); or
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or of crimes
in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which
the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony offenses.
(7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for a
period of time shall operate as an application for a permanent criminal stalking injunction
limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim.
(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued without a hearing unless the
defendant requests a hearing at the time of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and
mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance. The court shall give the
defendant notice of his right to request a hearing.
(i) If the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be held at the time of the verdict, finding, or
plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance unless
the victim requests otherwise, or for good cause.
(ii) If the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or
acceptance of plea in abeyance was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of the judgment
and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in abeyance must be filed
3 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the LexisNexis Group. AH rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.

by the victim in the district court as an application and request for hearing for a permanent
criminal stalking injunction.
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief:
(i) an order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place
of employment of the victim and requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim and
members of the victim's immediate family or household and to stay away from any specified
place that is named in the order and isfrequentedregularly by the victim; and
(ii) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with the victim, including an
order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any communication
likely to cause annoyance or alarm, including personal, written, or telephone contact with the
victim, the victim's employers, employees, fellow workers, or others with whom communication
would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim.
(c) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved upon application of the victim
to the court which granted the order.
(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section shall be
sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or similar system.
(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section shall be effective
statewide.
(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section shall constitute an offense of
stalking. Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a criminal
action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both.
(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude the filing of a criminal information for stalking
based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the stalking injunction issued
pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or permanent criminal stalking injunction.
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76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of
such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable
of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or
unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over
tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury,
that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic storage
or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing information in a form
capable of being preserved.
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